OpenTC Newsletter
June 2007
From the Open Trusted Computing (OpenTC) research project, sponsored by the
European Union.
In this issue:
•
Editorial: Why this newsletter?
•
OpenTC – an open approach to trusted virtualization
•
Report from the conference “The World of Trusted Computing – Hightech in
Europe”
•
OpenTC publications available
Editorial: Why this newsletter?
By: Arnd and Dirk Weber, ITAS, Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe, Germany
Dear reader,
Welcome to the first newsletter of the Open Trusted Computing (OpenTC) project. It
was created to inform the interested public about downloadable prototypes, project
achievements and other up-to-date information, and it is meant as a mean to start
discussions about the underlying issues. We aim to publish this newsletter irregularly
during the course of the project.
The Open Trusted Computing (OpenTC) project aims at building a secure hypervisor,
using Trusted Computing (TC) technologies. In other words, OpenTC aims at creating
a hypervisor for the virtualisation of hardware used by operating systems that are
running in different compartments and in parallel, on top of the hypervisor. These
compartments, including the hypervisor, are secured using the Trusted Platform
Module (TPM). In such an environment, operating systems such as Linux and
Windows will be able to run in strongly isolated compartments. Inside the
compartments, applications may use TC or not - it will be for the user to choose. The
source code of the hypervisor will be published as Open Source Software in order to
be transparent, and show to the public what the hypervisor does and how it achieves
it.
In this first issue of the OpenTC newsletter, the first article provides a short overview
of the project objectives, written by the project leader Dirk Kuhlmann. A larger high
level overview of the project is available on the project website:
http://www.opentc.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=2
9
The second article, written by Arnd Weber, is a report about one of the first Trusted
Computing conferences, that took place in Berlin in October 2006. It provides an
overview of some TC applications and highlights some of the key issues debated by
the audience.
At the end of the newsletter, we provide two lists of publications that are now
available on the OpenTC website. One is a list of consortium “deliverables”. These
are documents that have been delivered by the OpenTC consortium to the European
Commission. A list of scientific publications written by project members is also
given. Some of these papers can also be found on the project website, while others are
available in journals and in conference proceedings.
About the authors: Arnd and Dirk Weber work with the Institute for Technology
Assessment and Systems Analysis (ITAS) at Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe,
Germany. They work on requirements and dissemination activities of the OpenTC
project.
Contact: {arnd, dirk}.weber at itas.fzk.de
OpenTC – an open approach to trusted virtualisation
By: Dirk Kuhlmann, Hewlett Packard Laboratories, Bristol, UK
Editor´s note: This article was originally published in the INDICARE Monitor, a
newsletter of the EU-project INDICARE (INformed DIalogue about Consumer
Acceptability of DRM Solutions in Europe), on January 2, 2006, licensed under
Creative Commons (
http://www.indicare.org/tiki-read_article.php?articleId=183
).
Introduction
The advent of "Trusted Computing" (TC) technology as specified by the Trusted
Computing Group (cf. references) has not met much enthusiasm by the Free/Open
Source Software (FOSS) and LINUX communities so far. Despite this fact, FOSS
based systems have become the preferred vehicle for much of the academic and
industrial research on Trusted Computing. In parallel, a lively public discussion
between proponents and critics of TC has dealt with the question of whether the
technology and concepts put forward by the TCG are compatible, complementary or
potentially detrimental to the prospects of open software development models and
products.
Common misconceptions of TC technology are that it implies or favours closed and
proprietary systems, reduces options of using arbitrary software, or remotely controls
users' computers. It has long been argued, though, that these and similar undesirable
effects are by no means unavoidable, not least because the underlying technology is
passive and neutral with regard to specific policies. The actual features displayed by
TC equipped platforms will almost exclusively be determined by the design of the
operating systems and software running on top of it. With appropriate design,
implementation and validation of trusted software components, and by using
contractual models of negotiating policies, negative effects can be circumvented while
improving the system's trust and security properties. This is the intellectual starting
point of the EU-supported, collaborative OpenTC research and development project
that started in November 2005.
Combining FOSS and TC technology
OpenTC aims to demonstrate that a combination of TC technology and FOSS has
several inherent advantages that are hard to meet by any proprietary approach.
Enhanced security at the technical level tends to come at the expense of constraining
user options, and the discursive nature of FOSS-development could help to find the
right balance here. Trusted software components have to be protected from analysis
during runtime, so it is highly desirable that their design is documented and that the
source code is available to allow for inspection and validation. Finally, any attempts
to introduce TC technology are likely to fail without the buy-in of its intended users,
and openness could prove to be the most important factor for user acceptance.
OpenTC sets out to support cooperative security models that can be based on platform
properties without having to assume the identifiability, personal accountability and
reputation of platform owners or users. For reasons of privacy and efficiency, these
models could be preferable to those assuming adversarial behaviour from the outset.
A policy model based on platform properties, however, requires reliable audit
facilities and trustworthy reporting of platform states to both local users and remote
peers. The security architecture put forward by the TCG supplies these functions,
including a stepwise verification of platform components with an integral, hardware-
assisted auditing facility at its root. In OpenTC, this will be used as a basic building
block.
Trusted virtualisation and protected execution environments
The goal of the OpenTC architecture is to provide execution environments for whole
instances of guest operating systems that communicate to the outside world through
reference monitors guarding their information flow properties. The monitors kick into
action as soon as an OS instance is started. Typically, the policy enforced by a
reference monitor should be immutable during the lifetime of the instance: it can
neither be relaxed through actions initiated by the hosted OS nor overridden by
system management facilities. In the simplest case, this architecture will allow two
independent OS instances to be run, with different grades of security lock-down on an
end user system. Such a model, with an unconstrained "green" environment for web
browsing, software download and installation, and a tightly guarded "red" side for tax
record, banking communications etc., has recently been discussed by Carl Landwehr
(2005). More complex configurations are possible and are frequently needed in server
scenarios.
OpenTC is borrowing from research on trusted operating systems that goes back as
far as 30 years. The underlying principles – isolation and information flow control –
have been implemented by several security hardened versions of Linux, and it has
been demonstrated that such systems can be integrated with Trusted Computing
technology (see e.g. Maruyama et al. 2003). However, the size and complexity of
these implementations is a serious challenge for any attempt to seriously evaluate
their actual security properties. The limited size of developer communities, and
difficulties of understanding and complexity of managing configurations and policies,
continue to be road blocks for the deployment of trusted platforms and systems on a
wider scale.
Compared to full-blown operating systems, the tasks of virtualisation layers tend to be
simpler. This should allow OpenTC to reduce the size of the Trusted Computing
Base. The architecture separates management and driver environments from the core
system and hosted OS instances. They can either be hosted under stripped-down
Linux instances, or they can run as generic tasks of the virtualisation engines. The
policy enforced by the monitors is separated from decision and enforcement
mechanisms. It is human readable and can therefore be subjected to prior negotiation
and explicit agreement.
OpenTC chose (para-)virtualisation as the underlying architecture for a trusted system
architecture, which allows standard OS distributions and applications to be run side
by side with others that are locked down for specific purposes. This preempts a major
concern raised with regard to Trusted Computing, namely, that TC excludes
components not vetted by third parties. The OpenTC architecture allows the imposing
of constraints on components marked as security critical, while unconstrained
components can run in parallel.
OpenTC builds on two virtualisation engines: XEN and L4. Both are available under
FOSS licenses and are boosted by active developer and user communities. Currently,
it is necessary to compile special versions of Linux that cooperate with the underlying
virtualisation layer. However, the development teams will improve their architectures
to also support unmodified, out-of-the-box distributions. This will be simplified by
hardware support for virtualisation as offered by AMD's and INTEL's new CPU
generations. Prototypic results have shown that this hardware support could also allow
hosting unmodified operating systems other than Linux (see e.g. Shankland 2005).
From trusted to trustworthy computing
TCG hardware provides basic mechanisms to record and report the startup and
runtime state of a platform in an extremely compressed, non-forgeable manner. It
allows the creation of a digitally signed list of values that correspond to elements of
the platform's Trusted Computing Base. In theory, end users could personally validate
each of these components, but this is not a practical option. End users may have to
rely on other parties to evaluate and attest that a particular set of values corresponds to
a system configuration with a desired behaviour. In this case, their reason to trust will
ultimately stem from social trust users put in statements from specific brands,
certified public bodies, or peers groups.
A much discussed dilemma arises if trusted components become mandatory
prerequisites for consuming certain services. Even if such components are suspicious
to the end user, they might still be required by a provider. This problem is particularly
pronounced if named components come as binaries only and do not allow for analysis.
The recent history of DRM technology has shown that trojans can easily be inserted
under the guise of legitimate policy enforcement modules. Clearly, a mechanism that
enforces DRM on a specific piece of content acquired by a customer must not assume
an implicit permission to sift through the customer's hard disk and report back on
other content.
This highlights an important requirement for components that deserve the label
"trusted": at least in principle, it should be possible to investigate their actual
trustworthiness. A clearly stated description of function and expected behaviour
should be an integral part of their distribution, and it should be possible to establish
that they do not display behaviour other than that stated in their description – at
compile time, runtime, or both. A socially acceptable approach to Trusted Computing
will require transparency and open processes. In this respect, a FOSS based approach
looks promising, as it might turn openness into a crucial competitive advantage.
The TCG specification is silent on procedures or credentials required before a
software component can be called "trusted". OpenTC works on the assumption that
defined methodologies, tools, and processes to describe goals and expected behaviour
of software components are needed. In this way, it will become possible to check
whether their implementation reflects (and is constrained to) their description.
Independent replication of tests may be required to arrive at a commonly accepted
view of a component's trustworthiness, which in turn requires accessibility of code,
design, test plans and environments for the components under scrutiny.
Trust, risk, and freedom
Most of us have little choice but to trust IT systems where more and more things can
go wrong, while our actual insight into what is actually happening on our machines
gets smaller by the day. Users are facing a situation of having to bear full legal
responsibility for actions initiated on or by their machines while lacking the
knowledge, tools and support to keep these systems in a state fit for purpose. Due to
the growing complexity of our technology, we will increasingly have to rely on
technical mechanisms that help us to estimate the risk prior to entering IT based
transactions. Enhanced protection, security and isolation features based on TCG
technology will become standard elements of proprietary operating systems and
software in due time.
This evolution is largely independent of whether FOSS communities endorse or reject
this technology. OpenTC assumes that mutual attestation of the platforms' "fitness for
purpose" will become necessary for proprietary systems as well as FOSS based ones.
The absence of comparable protection mechanisms for non-proprietary operating or
software systems will immediately create problems for important segments of
professional Linux users. In fact, many commercial, public or governmental entities
have chosen non-proprietary software for reasons of transparency and security. These
organizations tend to be subjected to stringent compliance regulations requiring state-
of-the-art protection mechanisms. If FOSS based solutions do not support these
mechanisms, the organizations could eventually be forced to replace their non-
proprietary components with proprietary ones: a highly undesirable state of affairs
that OpenTC might help to avoid.
From this perspective, the current discussion about the next version of the GNU
public license raises serious concerns. Some of the suggested changes could impact
on the possibility of combining Trusted Computing technology and Free Software
licensed under GPLv3 - this refers to the GPLv3 Draft, status 2006-02-07 16:50 (cf.
references). Section 3 of this draft concerns Digital Restrictions Management, a term
that has been used by Richard Stallman in discussions about Trusted Computing. For
example, the current draft excludes “modes of distribution that deny users that run
covered works the full exercise of the legal rights granted by this License”. It is an
open question whether this might apply to elements of a security architecture such as
OpenTC. A Trusted Computing architecture does not constrain the freedom of
copying, modifying and sharing works distributed under the GPL. However, it can
constrain the option of running modified code as a trusted component, since
previously evaluated security properties might have been affected by the
modifications. Unless a re-evaluation is performed, the properties of modified
versions cannot be derived from the attestation of the original code; security
assurances about the original code become invalid.
This is by no means specific to the Trusted Computing approach; it also applies to
commercial Linux server distributions with protection profiles evaluated according to
the Common Criteria. The source code for the distribution is available, but changing
any of the evaluated components results in loss of the certificate. Whether or not
software is safe, secure, or trustworthy is independent of the question of how it is
licensed and distributed. The option to choose between proprietary and FOSS
solutions is an important one and should be kept open. This is one of the reasons why
several important industrial FOSS providers and contributors are participating in
OpenTC. The project aims at a practical demonstration that Trusted Computing
technology and FOSS can complement each other. This is possible in the context of
the current GPLv2. Whether it will be so under a new GPLv3 remains to be seen.
References:
•
GPLv3 Draft, status 2006-02-07 16:50:
http://gplv3.fsf.org/draft
•
Landwehr, Carl (2005): Green Computing. IEEE Security&Privacy, Vol 3, No
6, Nov/Dec 2005, p. 3
•
Maruyama et al. (2003): Linux with TCPA Integrity Measurement. IBM
Research Report RT0575, January 2003;
http://www.research.ibm.com/trl/people/munetoh/RT0507.pdf
•
Shankland, Stephen (2005): XEN passes Windows Milestone. CNET
News.com, August 23, 2005;
http://news.com.com/Xen+passes+Windows+milestone/2100-7344_3-
5842265.html
•
Trusted Computing Group:
http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
Disclaimer
The content of this paper is published under the sole responsibility of the author. It
does not necessarily reflect the position of HP Laboratories or other OpenTC
members.
About the author:
Dirk Kuhlmann is a senior research engineer for Hewlett Packard Laboratories in
Bristol, UK, where he works as a member of the Trusted Systems Laboratory. He acts
as the overall technical lead for the OpenTC project.
Contact: dirk.kuhlmann at hp.com
Report from the conference “The World of Trusted Computing – Hightech in
Europe”, Berlin, Germany, October 19-20, 2006
By Arnd Weber, ITAS, Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe, Germany
The German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, together with Ruhr-
Universitaet Bochum and ISITS (International School of IT Security), organised a
conference on the needs of European public and private organisations regarding
Trusted Computing (TC) and the future of this global initiative. The conference took
place in October 2006 and was sponsored by Hewlett Packard, Sirrix Security
Technologies, Computer-Zeitung (a German computer magazine) and Linux Magazin.
It was organised in the Ministry’s spacious facilities of the former Kaiser Wilhelm-
Akademie for military physicians, and was chaired by Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi from
Ruhr-Universitaet Bochum (Germany). 85 participants from Europe, Japan, Israel and
USA discussed over two days a variety of issues related to TC and its deployment. It
is outside the scope of this report to provide a detailed review of the content of all of
the 18 talks that were given by speakers from Germany, Belgium, Japan, UK, and US.
Instead, three key aspects of the discussions will be highlighted in this article.
The first significant aspect developed during the conference is the high level of
security provided by the combination of new processor architectures together with TC
technology. David Grawrock from Intel, the originator and editor of the TCG’s Best
Practices Paper, spoke about the security of the new Intel architecture, formerly
referred to as Intel LaGrande Technology and now called Trusted Execution
Technology, which contributes to the provision of a trusted platform environment.
David Grawrock explained that the new processor architecture (similar to OpenTC
partner AMD’s AMD-V architecture, formerly called “Pacifica”) is aimed at a strict
separation of the system kernel and applications by supporting the new virtualisation
technology. By making use of TC technology, the new processors should be capable
of providing virtualisation similar to mainframe computer task separation.
Additionally, the new Intel processors will contain a special functionality block
(together with a separate dedicated memory cache module) for measuring code and
data structures, one of the main functions in the TCG standards that is currently
implemented in the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Using this architecture, security
attacks such as Trojan horses mentioned by Udo Helmbrecht, President of the German
Federal Office for Information Security, can hopefully be prevented.
A second aspect discussed during the conference is the topic of the applications of
Trusted Computing. The applications mentioned by the speakers can be grouped as
follows:
•
Protection against theft of hard disk data. If user data are encrypted using TC,
theft of the hard disk is no longer a threat. In addition, as mentioned by Peter
Biddle from Microsoft, decommissioning of hard disks is eased significantly,
as one simply needs to reset the TPM.
•
Trusted Network Connect (TNC), allowing corporations to verify the security
of machines which are accessing their network. Michael Hartmann of SAP
highlighted the significant progress that TNC brings.
•
Marit Hansen from the Independent Centre for Privacy Protection Schleswig-
Holstein (Germany) talked about the possibilities and opportunities for using
Trusted Computing to protect the privacy of users, for example in eHealth.
•
Digital Rights Management was another example of a Trusted Computing
application. Supply chains can be designed to protect the rights of the different
companies involved, for example in the automotive industry. Furthermore,
secure communication between patent holders and patent lawyers can also be
implemented using DRM.
•
Protecting applications from each other was mentioned by several speakers
from different companies, for example for consolidating servers, in grid
computing, in car navigation systems, as well as in eGovernment, eCommerce
and eHealth applications. Applications used on behalf of one’s employer on a
private home PC can be separated from applications used for private reasons.
Speakers also mentioned secure printing, multi-player games, and mobile
phone applications.
A third group of issues debated at the conference comprises open questions raised by
the speakers and the participants, such as:
•
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, the leader of the EMSCB project (European
Multilaterally Secure Computing Base), pointed out that Trusted Computing is
an emerging technology and that there are still many technical and non-
technical challenges for Trusted Computing to face, and that the Trusted
Computing Group (TCG) should work more closely with academia and
support research and education in this area.
•
An important question is whether Trusted Computing is open and will remain
so in the future. This set of issues starts with the question of whether a TPM is
compliant with the TCG standard (a topic developed in the presentation given
by Georg Rankl from Infineon). Ruhr-Universitaet Bochum (Germany) tested
most of the TPMs available on the market and discovered that some TPMs are
not fully compliant with the TCG specifications. Another issue is whether
computer architectures will remain open in the future. European governments
want this openness of specification and design, as Ulrich Sandl from the
Ministry of Economics and Technology discussed. The EMSCB and OpenTC
projects are important projects that will help to ensure that Trusted Computing
systems are open. Jacques Bus from the European Commission mentioned
research on TC supported by his department, i.e. the projects OpenTC, Re-
TRUST and Robin.
•
Stefan Bechtold from the Max Planck Institute pointed out that Trusted
Computing systems may lead to possible legal and economic problems, such
as the lack of competition when a single, all-encompassing infrastructure is set
up.
•
Seth Schoen from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) explained some
concerns regarding certain aspects of Trusted Computing Technology such as
attestation. In particular he brought up the issue of who decides what is
trustworthy.
•
A hot topic on the agenda is the implementation of a secure hypervisor, a
trustworthy implementation of the virtualisation concept, as confirmed by
Peter Biddle from Microsoft. This is a major objective of the OpenTC project.
•
Dirk Kuhlmann, the OpenTC project’s technical leader, working at the HP
laboratories, brought up the question of how to host Windows on such a
hypervisor, an issue where he would like to obtain support from European
governments.
•
For David Grawrock from Intel, one of the important research issues is to
figure out exactly what evidence a relying party needs in order to be able to
trust a remote platform.
•
The author brought up the question of assessing the level of assurance that can
be guaranteed to the user if the new processors really provide their claimed
level of security, in particular with regard to isolation properties.
Is the debate over Trusted Computing over? Well, if people with differing views such
as Peter Biddle from Microsoft and Seth Schoen from the Electronic Frontier
Foundation can openly discuss the underlying issues, one can believe that progress is
taking place. The number of useful applications as well as the mood of the discussion
suggests that the debates have become more objective and less polemical. However,
the open issues and the possibility of charging more for software and content by using
TC technology means that the topic of Trusted Computing will remain on the agenda,
from technical but also political and economic perspectives. Jacques Bus from the
European Commission demanded the continuation of the dialogue with all
stakeholders.
References:
•
Computer-Zeitung: Trusted Computing hat als rotes Tuch ausgedient (in
German). October 31, 2006:
http://www.computer-
zeitung.de/themen/sicherheit/article.html?thes=&art=/articles/2006045/30859
942_ha_CZ.html
•
Intel Trusted ExecutionTechnology:
http://www.intel.com/technology/security/
•
ISITS (International School of IT Security):
https://www.is-its.org/
•
Ruhr-Universitaet Bochum, Applied Data Security Group:
http://www.prosec.rub.de/
•
Trusted Computing Group, Best Practices and Principles:
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/specs/bestpractices/
About the author:
Arnd Weber works with the Institute for Technology Assessment and Systems
Analysis (ITAS) at Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe, Germany. He acts as editor of this
newsletter and leads the work on requirements in the OpenTC project.
Contact: arnd.weber at itas.fzk.de
OpenTC publications available
The OpenTC project has produced several documents related to its various activities.
These include public deliverables and scientific publications.
Public deliverables
You can access the public deliverables from the OpenTC project via this webpage:
http://www.opentc.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=27&Itemid=4
1
The following deliverables are available:
•
D01.3 - Executive Summary of the first project year of OpenTC
•
D02.2 - Requirements and specifications report
•
D04.1 – Basic Management Interface Specification V.01
•
D07.1 - Security Requirements definition, Target Selection, Methodology
Definition
•
D10.1 - Intermediate report about all external cooperation and activities
•
D10.4 – Training concepts and training plans
Scientific publications
Scientific publications of the project are listed on this webpage:
http://www.opentc.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=27&Itemid=4
1
Among the scientific publications you can find:
•
Alkassar, A.; Scheibel, M.; Sadeghi, A-R.; Stueble, C.; Winandy, M.: Security
Architecture for Device Encryption and VPN, accepted for ISSE (Information
Security Solution Europe) 2006.
•
Birk, D.; Gajek, S.; Grobert, F.; Sadeghi, A-R.: Phishing phishers -
oberserving and tracing organized cybercrime. In: IEEE Cyberfraud, 2007 (to
appear).
•
Chen, L.; Landfermann, R.; Loehr, L.; Rohe, M.; Sadeghi, A-R.; Stueble, C.:
A Protocol for Property-Based Attestation, accepted for The First ACM
Workshop on Scalable Trusted Computing (STC'06).(available at
www.opentc.net)
•
Gajek, S.; Sadeghi, A-R.: Client Authentication in Federations Using a
Security Mode, accepted to be presented at Toward a More Secure Web -
W3C Workshop on sability and Transparency of Web Authentication.
(available at
http://www.w3.org/2005/Security/usability-ws/program
).
•
Gajek, S.; Sadeghi, A-R.; Stueble, C.; Winandy, M.: Compartmented Security
for Browsers - Or How to Thwart a Phisher with Trusted Computing, accepted
for The Second International Conference on Availability, Reliability and
Security (ARES 2007). (available at www.opentc.net)
•
Gallery, E.; Balfe, S.: Mobile Agents and the Deus Ex Machina: Protecting
Agents using Trusted Computing. In: Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE
International Symposium on Ubisafe Computing (UbiSafe-07), Niagara Falls,
Ontario, Canada, May 21-23, 2007. (available at www.opentc.net)
•
Gallery, E.; Mitchell, C.: Trusted Computing Technologies and their Use in
the Provision of High Assurance SDR Platforms. In: Proceedings of the 5th
Software Defined Radio Technical Conference (SDR 2006), Orlando, Florida,
USA, 13-17 November 2006. Invited paper. (available at www.opentc.net)
•
Huber, U.; Sadeghi, A-R.; Wolf, M.: Security Architectures for Software
Updates and Content Protection in Vehicles, accepted for Automotive Safety
and Security 2006, Stuttgart, Germany.
•
Jansen, B.; Ramasamy, H. V.; Schunter, M.: Flexible Integrity Protection and
Verification Architecture for Virtual Machine Monitors. Presented at the 2nd
Workshop on Advances in Trusted Computing, Tokyo, Japan. (available at
www.opentc.net)
•
Loehr, H.; Ramasamy, H. V.; Sadeghi, A-R.; Schulz, S.; Schunter, M.; Stüble,
C.: Enhancing Grid Security Using Trusted Virtualization. Proceedings of the
4th International Conference on Autonomic and Trusted Computing (ATC-
2007), to appear. (available at www.opentc.net)
A preliminary version of the above paper was presented (not published) at
the:
-
2nd Workshop on Advances in Trusted Computing (WATC-2006),
Tokyo, Japan, December 2006.
And at the:
-
1st Benelux Workshop on Information and System Security,
Antwerpen, Belgium, November, 2006.
•
Manulis, M.; Sadeghi, A-R.: Property-based Taming Lying Mobile Nodes,
accepted for International Workshop on Trusted and Autonomic Computing
Systems (TACS 2006) at 20th IEEE International Conference on Advanced
Information Networking and Applications (AINA 2006), 18.-20. April,
Vienna, Austria.
•
Ramasamy, H. V.; Schunter, M.: Architecting Dependable Systems Using
Virtualization. Workshop on Architecting Dependable Systems: Supplemental
Volume of the 2007 International Conference on Dependable Systems and
Networks (DSN-2007), to appear. (available at www.opentc.net)
•
Sadeghi, A-R.; Scheibel, M.; Stueble, C.; Winandy, M.: Design and
Implementation of a Secure Linux Device Encryption Architecture, accepted
to be presented at Linux-Tag 2006.
•
Sadeghi, A-R.; Selhorst, M.; Stueble, C.; Wachsmann, C.; Winandy, M.: TCG
Inside? - A Note on TPM Specification Compliance, accepted for The First
ACM Workshop on Scalable Trusted Computing (STC'06).
•
Sadeghi, A-R.; Scheibel, M.; Stueble, C.; Wolf, M.: Play it once again, Sam -
Enforcing Stateful Licenses on Open Platforms, accepted to be presented at
The Second Workshop on Advances in Trusted Computing (WATC '06 Fall).
Edited by the Institute for Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis,
Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe, Germany, on behalf of the OpenTC research project
consortium, in co-operation with all partners.
Editor: Arnd Weber, Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe GmbH, ITAS, Hermann-von-
Helmholtz-Platz 1, D-76344 Eggenstein-Leopoldshafen, Telephone: + 49 7247 82
3737.
Contact: editor at opentc.net
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in the articles do not necessarily reflect
those of the European Commission and the consortium or partners thereof. All articles
are regarded as personal statements of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those
of the organisation they work for.
The OpenTC-project is a research project supported by the European Commission,
project IST-027635. Its 23 partners are: Technikon Forschungs- und
Planungsgesellschaft mbH (project coordination, AT); Hewlett-Packard Ltd (technical
leader, UK); AMD Saxony LLC & Co. KG (DE); Budapest University of Technology
and Economics (HU); Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique – LIST (FR); COMNEON
GmbH (DE); Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe GmbH – ITAS (DE); Horst Goertz
Institute for IT Security, Ruhr-Universitaet Bochum (DE); IBM Research GmbH
(CH); Infineon Technologies AG (DE); INTEK Closed Joint Stock Company (RU);
ISECOM (ES); Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (BE); Politecnico di Torino (IT);
Portakal Teknoloji (TR); Royal Holloway, University of London (UK); SUSE Linux
Products GmbH (DE); Technische Universitaet Dresden (DE); Technische
Universitaet Graz (AT); Technische Universitaet Muenchen (DE); Technical
University of Sofia (BR); TUBITAK – UEKAE (TR); and University of Cambridge
(UK).
For more information about the project, see:
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